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FROM APATHY TO ACTIVISM: THE EMERGENCE, 
IMPACT, AND FUTURE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AS 
THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NORM 
LISA M. FAIRFAX* 
ABSTRACT 
The conventional and long-held view that public company shareholders are, 
and should be, rationally apathetic is waning. Today, public company 
shareholders are active. Such shareholders have actively sought to increase 
their voting power and influence over director elections and other important 
corporate matters. These shareholders not only have been voting, but they also 
have been voting against management preferences. Moreover, public company 
shareholders increasingly have begun to request, and in some instances 
demand, that corporate officers and directors engage with them around a range 
of issues. The shift away from shareholder apathy reflects a radical departure 
from the traditional corporate governance norm of shareholder passivity. While 
many corporate governance experts have conceded the descriptive shift away 
from shareholder apathy (at least temporarily), few have acknowledged the 
normative shift and its related significance. This Article acknowledges that shift, 
and in so doing advances three important claims related to shareholders and 
the corporate governance landscape. First, this Article maintains that increased 
shareholder activism reflects a considerable descriptive shift in the manner in 
which shareholders use their voting power to engage with the corporation. 
Second, and more importantly, this Article asserts that such increased activism 
reflects a normative shift pursuant to which shareholders, corporate officers, 
and directors have come to believe that shareholder activism is normatively 
appropriate, at least to a certain extent and for certain shareholders. In light of 
the long-held belief in the viability and validity of shareholder apathy, this shift 
is remarkable. Third, this Article argues that, even if efforts to scale back 
shareholder activism gain some traction, those efforts will prove challenging 
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to Ashante Rosier-Robinson for her tremendous research assistance. I would like to thank Jill 
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Changing Landscape as well as the members of the George Washington Law School faculty 
workshop for their insightful suggestions on earlier versions of this draft. I also would like to 
thank Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., for his helpful comments throughout the writing process. All 
errors, of course, are mine. This Article is dedicated to Bayo Sharpe—may His peace be with 
you ‘till we meet again. 
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and may be doomed to failure because of the normative shift embracing 
shareholder activism as an appropriate element of corporate governance. In 
these ways, this Article argues that shareholder activism is the new corporate 
governance norm and, as a consequence, corporations, officers, directors, 
shareholders, and regulators must both acknowledge and account for that norm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public company shareholders are rationally apathetic. Historically, most 
viewed this statement as an undisputable and uncontroversial fact.1 Shareholder 
apathy was reflected primarily in shareholders’ voting behavior, whereby most 
public company shareholders either did not vote or voted exactly as management 
recommended them to vote.2 Perhaps more importantly, most viewed 
shareholder apathy as “rational,” and as the preferred corporate governance 
norm. This preference rested on two distinct but related rationales. On the one 
hand, public company shareholders were not only too dispersed to collectively 
act, but also too dispersed to gain the knowledge and experience necessary to 
ensure that their actions would be informed and thus in the corporation’s best 
interests.3 On the other hand, directors were better situated, better informed, and 
thus better suited to make decisions on behalf of the corporation.4 These 
conventional understandings rendered shareholder apathy rational and 
preferable. Hence, it was conventional wisdom, shared by corporate officers, 
directors, and shareholders alike, that shareholder apathy was the corporate 
governance norm. 
Today, the public company shareholder is far from apathetic. Such 
shareholders5 have actively sought to increase their voting power and influence 
over director elections and other important corporate matters.6 Not only have 
shareholders been voting, but they also have been voting against management 
 
1 See infra Part I (discussing rational apathy of dispersed public shareholders). 
2 See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 521 
(1990). 
3 See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-96 (1986) (noting that coordination costs for 
dispersed shareholders create rational apathy); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395 (1983) (suggesting that dispersed 
shareholders are rationally apathetic because their individual votes will not likely make a 
difference); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem 
of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46 (1988); Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of 
Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2013) (noting that “dispersed shareholders were rationally 
apathetic”). 
4 See Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; Stephen 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 547, 558-60 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, The Means and Ends]; William W. Bratton 
& Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
653, 659-60 (2010). 
5 This Article will use the terms “shareholder” and “public company shareholder” 
interchangeably to refer to public (as distinct from private) company shareholders. 
6 See LISA FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
AND PARTICIPATION 3-4 (2011). 
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preferences.7 Moreover, shareholders increasingly have begun to request, and in 
some instances demand, that corporate officers and directors engage with them 
around a range of issues.8 
The shift away from shareholder apathy reflects a radical departure from the 
traditional corporate governance norm. While many corporate governance 
experts have conceded the descriptive shift away from shareholder apathy (at 
least temporarily),9 few have acknowledged the normative shift and its related 
significance. This Article acknowledges that shift, and in so doing advances 
three important claims related to shareholders and the corporate governance 
landscape. First, this Article maintains that increased shareholder activism 
reflects a considerable descriptive shift in the manner in which shareholders use 
their voting power to engage with the corporation. Second, and more 
importantly, this Article asserts that such increased activism reflects a normative 
shift pursuant to which shareholders, corporate officers, and directors have come 
to believe that shareholder activism is normatively appropriate, at least to a 
certain extent and for certain shareholders. In light of the long-held belief in the 
viability and validity of shareholder apathy, this shift is remarkable. Third, this 
Article argues that, even if efforts to scale back shareholder activism gain some 
traction, those efforts will prove challenging and may be doomed to failure 
because of the normative shift embracing shareholder activism as an appropriate 
element of corporate governance. Shareholder activism is the new corporate 
governance norm; as a consequence, it likely will remain a fixture of corporate 
governance in the future. 
This Article does not seek to respond to the debate regarding the propriety of 
shareholder activism. Considerable ink has been spent on that endeavor. This 
Article also does not seek to pinpoint or otherwise assess why shareholders have 
become more active, though this Article would assert that the rise in activism 
stems from multiple factors including an increase in hedge fund activism, the 
increased dominance of institutional shareholders in the public sphere, and 
corporate scandals that have not only focused attention on public company 
goverance, but also raised concerns about traditonal corporte governance norms. 
However, this Article does assert that shareholder activist proponents do appear 
 
7 See infra Part II (discussing rise of shareholder voting and willingness to reject director 
preferences). 
8 Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 
822; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 2018: BOARD 
SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN THE NEW INVESTOR ENVIRONMENT 3, 9 (2018); Deloitte, 
Shareholder Engagement: A New Era in Corporate Governance, WALL STREET J.: RISK & 
COMPLIANCE J. (Oct. 1, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/1 
0/01/shareholder-engagement-a-new-era-in-corporate-governance/. 
9 See NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., DIRECTOR ESSENTIALS: PREPARING THE BOARD FOR 
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 1 (2018), https://www.nacdonline.org/files/NACD%20Director%20 
Essentials%20Preparing%20the%20Board%20for%20Shareholder%20Activism%20Executi
ve%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/ASA7-QCX9] (referring to year-round shareholder 
activism as new norm in American boardrooms). 
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to have convinced the corporate community that activism is preferable to apathy 
at least for some shareholders. 
Part I explores the concept of shareholder apathy and the traditional consensus 
related to the reality and propriety of such apathy. Part II details the descriptive 
shift from apathy to activism. Part III demonstrates the manner in which the 
descriptive shift reflects a normative acceptance of shareholder activism. It 
begins by pinpointing the manner in which a broad spectrum of shareholders has 
come to accept the shareholder activism norm. Part III then demonstrates how 
corporate words and behavior reflect an embrace of the notion that shareholder 
activism is appropriate and in the best interests of the corporation. Indeed, 
corporate officers and directors not only have voluntarily implemented sweeping 
changes to corporate governance practices and policies, but also have actively 
sought to engage with shareholders in an effort to incorporate shareholder 
concerns into their business practices and plans. Importantly, as they engage in 
such behaviors, corporate officers and directors have expressed their belief that 
shareholder activism, in the form of shareholder influence and engagement, is 
in the corporation’s best interests. In these ways, corporate officers and directors 
have demonstrated a normative acceptance of shareholder activism, coupled 
with a rejection of the apathy norm.  
Part III then grapples with arguments against such acceptance. Some may 
disagree with this Article’s thesis based on the notion that directors have 
acquiesced to shareholder demands because they feel pressured, coerced, or even 
blackmailed,10 and thus may insist that such acquiescence cannot be construed 
as any form of agreement or acceptance of shareholder activism. Others may 
disagree based on the notion that directors’ behavior reflects a strategic decision, 
such as a preemptive strike or a cost-benefit analysis, rather than acceptance or 
agreement. Still others may disagree based on the claim that directors have only 
embraced the propriety of shareholder influence rhetorically, and hence 
directors’ words should be understood as a form of window-dressing rather than 
any actual belief. However, after careful consideration of directors’ behaviors, 
directors’ disclosures in proxy statements and other public documents, and 
directors’ understanding of their fiduciary duties, this Article refutes those 
arguments and instead insists that directors’ words and behaviors can and should 
be understood as an embrace of the appropriateness of shareholder activism. Part 
IV addresses the implications of that embrace, especially in light of regulatory 
 
10 See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1907, 1922 (2013) (noting that majority voting has “swept the field with boards caving 
in to shareholder demands”); see also JAMES MACGREGOR, ABERNATHY MACGREGOR GRP. 
INC., SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM ISN’T ALWAYS A GOOD THING 1 (2014), 
[https://perma.cc/3GZD-A4EB] (claiming that shareholders have been allowed to hijack the 
corporation); SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2014 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 6 (2014), 
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2014_Proxy_Season_Revi
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efforts and private ordering mechanisms aimed at reducing shareholder 
influence and participation. 
I. THE SHAREHOLDER APATHY TRADITON 
Conventional wisdom maintained that shareholders of public companies were 
rationally apathetic. This term encompassed two concepts: one descriptive and 
one normative. From a descriptive perspective, shareholder apathy encompasses 
the long-held understanding that voter turnout among public company 
shareholders was relatively low and that when shareholders bothered to vote, 
they most often voted in lock-step with management.11 Commentators viewed 
this decision to vote with management as a reflection of shareholder apathy 
because it appeared to reflect a conscious choice to simply rubber-stamp the 
preferences of management rather than actively engage.12 Shareholder apathy 
also was reflected in shareholders’ lack of desire to engage with corporate 
officers and directors. Instead, shareholders appeared content to remain inactive 
and essentially voiceless in the corporate enterprise.13 
From a normative perspective, both shareholders and corporate actors viewed 
shareholder apathy as “rational” and normatively appropriate. Appropriate not 
only because the problems associated with voting by a dispersed group of 
potentially uninformed and inexperienced shareholders made shareholder 
activism undesirable, but also because of the strong preference for granting 
presumably more experienced and informed directors and officers broad 
discretion to make business decisions free of interference from shareholders and 
other constituents. This Part unpacks both the descriptive and normative 
concepts embedded in shareholder apathy. 
A. The Descriptive Case for Shareholder Apathy 
From a descriptive standpoint, shareholder apathy was reflected in a variety 
of ways. First, voter turnout among public company shareholders was relatively 
low.14 Corporate statutes grant shareholders the power to vote in director 
elections and other fundamental transactions.15 However, it has been understood 
that, at least historically, most public company shareholders did not exercise 
their vote, particularly in director elections.16 This understanding stemmed from 
the general presumption that shareholders in public companies are dispersed and 
 
11 See Black, supra note 2, at 521. 
12 Id. 
13 See Stout, supra note 3, at 1169. 
14 See id. 
15 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 242(b), 251(c) (2019) (describing director 
elections, charter amendmens, and merger or consolidation respectively); MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT §§ 7.28, 10.03, 10.20(B), 11.04 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (same). 
16 See Black, supra note 2, at 521; Gordon, supra note 3, at 46 (noting shareholder apathy 
reflected in low shareholder engagement on a range of issues); Stout, supra note 3, at 1169. 
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hold relatively small amounts of shares, decreasing the likelihood that such 
shareholders would be incentivized to vote.17  
Second, even when shareholders did vote, they rarely used their vote to 
challenge directors.18 This rarity was reflected in both uncontested and contested 
elections. With respect to uncontested elections, shareholders rarely voted 
against incumbent directors.19 Courts and corporate governance experts have 
referred to shareholder voting power, particularly in director elections, as 
quintessential and the most important power in the shareholders’ arsenal.20 The 
fact that shareholders simply rubber-stamped management choices in director 
elections therefore was viewed as a significant indicator of their apathy.21 In 
addition, shareholders did not engage in many election contests—referred to as 
proxy contests in the public company context.22 On those rare occasions when 
shareholders engaged in proxy contests, they seldom were successful.23 To be 
sure, the lack of success in such contests could reflect shareholder satisfaction 
with incumbent directors and officers or lack of satisfaction with the dissident 
slate. Nevertheless, commentators viewed the low level of proxy contests 
 
17 See Stout, supra note 3, at 1169 (asserting that shareholders do not pay attention or even 
vote because “[w]hat made the public corporation ‘public’ of course, was that it had thousands 
or even hundreds of thousands of shareholders, none of whom owned more than a small 
fraction of outstanding shares”); Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 417 (2006) (“It is common knowledge that individual 
shareholders generally are not interested in—or, at least not capable of—exercising their 
control rights effectively.”). 
18 See Black, supra note 2, at 526-27; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 310 (1999) (referring to rational 
apathy as leading shareholders to “vote for whomever and whatever management 
recommends” (quoting CLARK, supra note 3, at 94)); Stout, supra note 3, at 1169. 
19 See Black, supra note 2, at 526-27; Stout, supra note 3, at 1169. 
20 See EMAK Worldwide, Inc. v. Kurz, 50 A.3d 429, 433 (Del. 2012) (“Shareholder voting 
rights are sacrosanct. The fundamental governance right possessed by shareholders is the 
ability to vote for the directors the shareholder wants to oversee the firm.”); Pell v. Kill, 135 
A.3d 764, 793 (Del. Ch. 2016) (noting that denial of shareholders’ right to vote causes 
irreparable harm); Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 732 A.2d 1180, 1193 (Del. Ch. 1998) (noting 
that “the shareholder vote has primacy in our system of corporate governance”); Blasius 
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Co., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder franchise is 
the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”); Robert 
B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: “Sacred 
Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 274 (2001); Velasco, supra note 17, at 
411 (“[S]hareholder rights to elect directors and sell shares are indeed fundamental.”). 
21 See Black, supra note 2, at 521; Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The 
Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (1989) (noting 
that crucial premise of shareholder apathy is that “shareholders will consistently vote in 
support of management”). 
22 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 
688-89 (2007); Black, supra note 2, at 521. 
23 See Black, supra note 2, at 526-27. 
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coupled with the slim chance of success as another important indicator of 
shareholder apathy.24  
Third, shareholders also rarely voted inconsistently with management’s 
directives outside of the director election context.25 One important example of 
this rarity can be seen through shareholder voting patterns related to shareholder 
proposals. Federal law allows shareholders to submit proposals to the 
corporation’s proxy statement to be voted upon by other shareholders.26 When 
shareholders submit such proposals, management can also recommend whether 
they believe shareholders should support the proposals.27 Management almost 
always recommends that shareholders vote against shareholder proposals. 
Historically, shareholders almost always followed management’s 
recommendation, resulting in very few shareholder proposals passing with a 
majority vote or otherwise receiving any significant percentage of the 
shareholder vote.28 In other words, shareholder proposals almost never received 
support from other shareholders.29 By 1981, one commentator had found only 
two proposals not supported by management that nevertheless were approved 
by shareholders.30 Like uncontested director elections and proxy fights, 
shareholders’ decisions not to support shareholder proposals were viewed as a 
prime indicator of shareholder apathy, reflecting shareholders’ preference for 
simply rubber-stamping the choices of management and thus avoiding 
meaningful exercise of the vote.31  
Finally, shareholders did not seek out engagement with corporate officers and 
directors. Historically, shareholders did not submit many shareholder 
proposals.32 Because most public company shareholders were dispersed and thus 
did not attend the annual meeting in person, shareholder proposals are one of the 
 
24 See id. at 521, 526-27. As Professor Bernard Black has noted, the rarity of successful 
proxy fights epitomized the modern symbol of shareholder apathy. Id. 
25 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 46. 
26 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2018); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A 
Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 879 (1994). 
27 See Palmiter, supra note 26, at 922. 
28 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8’s Ordinary Business 
Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement by Proposal, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
705, 709 (2016); Myron P. Curzan & Mark L. Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy: 
Control of Investment Managers’ Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 670, 676 (1980); Palmiter, supra note 26, at 883. 
29 See Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When Shareholders 
Say Yes? Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions, 60 BUS. LAW. 23, 27 (2004); Susan W. 
Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 425, 426 
(1984); Palmiter, supra note 26, at 883. 
30 See Liebeler, supra note 29, at 426. 
31 See Black, supra note 2, at 527 (noting that shareholder passivity was reflected in low 
levels of support for shareholder proposals). 
32 See id. at 527, 584 (noting historical rarity of shareholder proposals); Brownstein & 
Kirman, supra note 29, at 26. 
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principal ways in which public company shareholders engage with 
management.33 Indeed, while such proposals are generally nonbinding, 
shareholder proposals reflect one of the only ways in which shareholders (as 
opposed to officers and directors) can encourage the corporation to adopt some 
measure or take some action.34 Thus, shareholder proposals can be used by 
shareholders to actively engage with management and to actively seek to 
influence managerial and corporate policies.35 Hence, shareholder proposals are 
often used as a marker for activism or the lack thereof.36 The fact that historically 
only a small subset of shareholders submitted proposals, and that they were not 
submitted in very large numbers, was another indicator of shareholders’ lack of 
activism and thus apathy.37  
Shareholders also did not seek out engagement opportunities beyond the 
shareholder proposal process. Indeed, historically, the idea of shareholder 
engagement was virtually nonexistent.38 Instead, except in very rare 
circumstances, neither shareholders nor corporate actors had any expectation 
that shareholders would seek out engagement opportunities, or that corporate 
actors would seek to engage with their shareholders.39 The fact that shareholders 
were not interested in engagement, or otherwise expected to engage, 
underscored their apathy. 
B. Apathy as THE Governance Norm 
Most in the corporate community viewed shareholder apathy as rational. 
Several reasons were advanced to support this view. Perhaps the most cited 
reasons have been collective action and free riding problems. The collective 
action problem refers to the notion that, because of their dispersed nature, public 
company shareholders find it difficult to act collectively and thus find it difficult 
to ensure that their votes would have any meaningful impact on outcomes.40 This 
difficulty makes it rational for such shareholders to refrain from dedicating the 
time or resources to become more active.41 The free rider problem relates to the 
notion that other shareholders would be able to “free ride” off of any shareholder 
 
33 See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 63-64; Palmiter, supra note 26, at 884. 
34 See Palmiter, supra note 26, at 883-84. 
35 See id. 
36 See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 63-64. 
37 See Black, supra note 2, at 527. 
38 See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 830. 
39 See id. 
40 See CLARK, supra note 3, at 390-96; Gordon, supra note 3, at 43; Velasco, supra note 
17, at 417. 
41 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 395 (suggesting that dispersed shareholders 
are rationally apathetic because their individual votes will not likely make a difference); 
Gordon, supra note 3, at 46 (describing high costs and low benefits of shareholders’ active 
engagement); Stout, supra note 3, at 1169 (noting that dispersed shareholders were rationally 
apathetic); Velasco, supra note 17, at 417. 
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efforts aimed at devoting the resources to become informed about particular 
issues to be voted upon.42 In this regard, the costs of voting, or of voting in an 
informed manner, were significantly outweighed by any benefits to be 
obtained.43 Taken together, collective action and free riding problems explained 
the rationality of shareholder apathy, demonstrating why it made sense that 
shareholders have no incentive to devote the time or resources to engage in the 
voting process. 
Most also viewed this apathy as normatively appropriate. Such a view 
primarily stemmed from a preference in favor of directors making business 
decisions without influence from shareholders. Such a preference was two-fold. 
On the one hand, shareholder influence was undesirable for many reasons. 
Public company shareholders suffer from informational asymmetries because 
they generally are not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company and thus 
have limited knowledge of corporate affairs.44 They also are not in the best 
position to gain needed information about the company and its operations, and 
otherwise may not have the requisite knowledge or expertise to make informed 
voting decisions.45 Then too, shareholders may be motivated by their personal 
interests or interests unrelated to corporate ones, particularly because 
shareholders typically have no fiduciary duty to act in the corporation’s best 
interests.46 Each of these reasons renders shareholder activism undesirable.  
Importantly, both corporate actors and shareholders embraced the 
appropriateness of shareholder apathy. Directors and officers clearly viewed 
shareholder apathy as preferable to shareholder activism or influence. Based on 
this view, directors and officers also saw shareholder engagement as 
unnecessary and unwarranted. Consistent with this view, Professor Bernard 
Black notes that proponents of shareholder apathy viewed the shareholder 
proposal process with “disdain,” not only because it was irrational to think that 
shareholders would use the process, but also because any use would be 
 
42 See Black, supra note 2, at 528 (“Free-rider problems work in tandem with the rational 
apathy of the free riders to discourage shareholder proposals from being made.”); Blair & 
Stout, supra note 18, at 310 (noting that free rider problem tended to inspire rational apathy); 
Gordon, supra note 3, at 44, 46 (discussing free rider problem in the context of shareholder 
opposition to management decisions). 
43 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 43. But see Romano, supra note 21, at 1611 (noting that 
rational apathy story greatly overstates the cost of becoming informed). 
44 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 11-12 (discussing information asymmetry rationale as 
justification for managerial control in the context of dual-class stock). 
45 See George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor 
Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 105, 133 (2010). 
46 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 53, 101 (2008); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate 
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 831 (1993). Courts have recognized a 
duty for shareholders only as it relates to majority or controlling shareholders. See Iman 
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ineffective and likely a nuisance.47 Shareholders appear to have a similar 
disdain, reflecting their agreement with the apathy norm. The lack of shareholder 
support for shareholder proposals could be viewed as their embrace of the belief 
that they do not find it appropriate for other shareholders to seek to influence 
important corporate matters. In this regard, the historical lack of support for such 
proposals may be a reflection of shareholders’ normative rejection of 
shareholder activism. Moreover, shareholders’ voting behaviors were viewed as 
their endorsement of shareholder apathy as a normative preference.48 
The other rationale supporting a normative preference for shareholder apathy 
stemmed from the notion that directors and officers are better positioned than 
shareholders to make decisions on behalf of the corporation.49 Unlike 
shareholders, directors not only have a duty to act in the corporation’s best 
interests,50 but also have the necessary knowledge and expertise to take such 
actions. Moreover, for those who believe that corporations should focus on 
maximizing the interests of all of their constituents, directors and officers are 
better positioned to engage in such focus, while shareholders may vote in a way 
that furthers their own personal interests without regard to other shareholders or 
other corporate stakeholders.51 Shareholder apathy was embraced as the 
appropriate corporate governance norm because shareholder power was 
problematic while director power was sacrosanct. 
C. The Naysayers 
To be sure, there was never universal consensus around the conventional 
wisdom of rational shareholder apathy either as a descriptive or normative 
matter.52 From a descriptive standpoint, Professor Roberta Romano notes that 
the characterization of shareholders as rationally apathetic involves “strong and 
 
47 See Black, supra note 2, at 527. 
48 See id. (describing rationally apathetic shareholder with little interest in voting); Stout, 
supra note 3, at 1180 (noting that investors have “eagerly” bought shares in companies 
structured to have weak shareholder rights); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of 
Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 803 (2007) (noting that shareholders prefer weak 
voting rights). 
49 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
50 See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also Blair & Stout, supra note 18, at 293-
94 (noting that while it has become commonplace to describe directors’ duties as being owed 
to shareholders, case law makes it clear that directors’ duties are owed to the corporation 
itself). 
51 See Blair & Stout, supra note 18, at 304-05; Stout, supra note 3, at 1170-71 (noting that 
Berle and Means “were not troubled” by shareholder apathy because they thought it more 
essential that directors and officers be allowed to run the public company for the benefit of 
employees, consumers and the broader society, in addition to shareholders). 
52 See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264 (1992); Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: 
Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with 
Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 430 (2002). 
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questionable assumptions concerning investor behavior.”53 Along these lines, 
several scholars have noted that the rational apathy theory was developed by 
political scientists to explain why people do not vote in political elections, not 
why they vote in a particular way—which is how many scholars have used the 
theory in the corporate governance context.54 In other words, is it truly accurate 
to characterize shareholders’ decisions to vote with management as an indicator 
of apathy? Some have argued that while rational apathy can be used to explain 
situations in which shareholders refrain from voting, it cannot be used to explain 
shareholders’ decisions to vote and to vote in a particular manner.55 Thus, many 
resisted the claim that shareholders’ voting behavior reflected “rational apathy.” 
Such scholars pointed to evidence appearing to refute shareholder apathy 
related to voting. This evidence stemmed not only from the fact that shareholders 
voted (regardless of how that vote was aligned), but also from the fact that, in 
some circumstances, shareholders voted against management.56 In fact, federal 
law requires some institutions to disclose their voting criteria.57 Such a 
requirement has resulted in increased voting by many institutional 
shareholders.58  
Then too, many contended that shareholders’ so-called apathy stemmed from 
legal impediments rather than an affirmative decision to refrain from voting.59 
As one scholar asserted, the rational apathy story assumes a “benign legal 
environment” pursuant to which “shareholders are passive despite legal 
efforts.”60 Instead, shareholders are “hobbled by a complex web of legal rules” 
that make it difficult for them to be active.61 In this regard, shareholder apathy 
stemmed from legal restraints rather than shareholder preference.62  
Scholars also insisted that the changing shareholder landscape undercut the 
shareholder apathy narrative. Indeed, the shareholder landscape has evolved 
from one in which individual or retail shareholders hold most of the outstanding 
public shares to one in which institutions are the dominant public company 
 
53 See Romano, supra note 21, at 1608. 
54 See Peter N. Flocos, Toward a Liability Rule Approach to the “One Share, One Vote” 
Controversy: An Epitaph for the SEC’s Rule 19c-4?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1761, 1792 (1990); 
Romano, supra note 21, at 1608. 
55 See Romano, supra note 21, at 1608. 
56 See id. at 1608-09. 
57 Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivaton and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 789, 805 (2014). 
58 See id. 
59 See Black, supra note 2, at 608 (pinpointing legal barriers, agenda control, and conflicts 
of interests as rationales for shareholder voting behavior). 
60 See id. at 523. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 524-25. 
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shareholders.63 The growth of institutional shareholders has meant that share 
ownership is no longer dispersed. Instead, institutions hold large shares of public 
company stock, and such institutions hold shares in a significant number of 
public companies.64 As shareholders become less disperse, the presumption that 
their apathy is rational becomes less persuasive. 
Scholars also disagreed with the notion that apathy was the preferable 
corporate governance norm. Such scholars instead insisted that shareholder 
activism served a crucial accountability function, and thus was needed to check 
the behavior of directors and officers.65 This disagreement with the normative 
preference for shareholder apathy has been a long-standing and consistent 
feature of the corporate governance landscape and discourse.66 
Regardless of this disagreement, even opponents of the shareholder apathy 
norm acknowledge the traditional dominance of that norm.67 Thus, as Professor 
Black emphasizes, most modern corporate scholars on either side of the apathy 
norm debate accept the dominance of the shareholder apathy norm.68 In addition, 
even as public share ownership became less disperse and thus apathy appeared 
less rational, the cultural norm favoring apathy ensured that public company 
shareholders also remained wedded to the view that shareholder apathy was the 
most acceptable and appropriate governance norm.69  
II. ACTIVISM AS THE NEW NORMAL 
This decade has witnessed a significant shift away from shareholder apathy 
both in a descriptive and normative manner. In a descriptive manner, this shift 
is reflected in a wave of actions that signal increased shareholder activism and 
influence. To be sure, individual shareholders, also referred to as retail investors, 
have not been caught in this wave. Instead, retail investors have continued to be 
apathetic even as institutional shareholder activism has increased significantly.70 
This Article acknowledges that the lack of increased activism by retail investors 
 
63 See id. at 524-25, 567-69; Melissa Sawyer & Marc Trevino, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, 
Review and Analysis of 2017 U.S. Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 10, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/10/revie 
w-and-analysis-of-2017-u-s-shareholder-activism [https://perma.cc/8Y96-45NG] (noting 
that concentration of ownership continues to rise). 
64 See Black, supra note 2, at 567-69; Sawyer & Trevino, supra note 63. 
65 See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 37-39; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 870 (2005). 
66 See supra note 65. 
67 See Black, supra note 2, at 528 (noting that shareholder apathy is “widely accepted” by 
both sides of the debate related to its appropriateness). 
68 See id. at 522. 
69 See id. at 523, 532, 563-64. 
70 See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution 
to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 60-61, 66 (2016). 
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is cause for concern.71 However, the lack of activism by retail investors does not 
negate this Article’s thesis, given that institutional shareholders dominate the 
public shareholder landscape,72 and that institutional shareholder activism has 
clearly increased. Of note, this Article uses the term “activism” to refer to 
activites aimed at increasing shareholder influence and power over the 
coporation. 
A. Shareholder Campaigns to Enhance Voting Power 
Shareholders have strenuously campaigned to increase their voting power, 
particularly with respect to director elections. This Section will focus on such 
campaigns related to majority voting, board declassification, proxy access, and 
supermajority voting. While there has been significant debate related to the 
merits and benefits of these campaigns,73 those who waged such campaigns 
viewed them as critical for enhancing shareholders’ voting power and 
influence.74 More importantly for purposes of this Article’s thesis, the mere 
existence and vigor of such campaigns are remarkable because they fly in the 
face of the notion that shareholders would not seek to use—let alone enhance—
their voting power. Thus, these campaigns highlight the shift away from 
shareholder apathy. 
1. Majority Voting 
One critical element of shareholder activism has been the majority voting 
campaign. In 2005, shareholders began advocating in earnest for majority voting 
to replace the rule of plurality voting in director elections.75 Plurality voting 
refers to a system whereby directors are elected so long as they receive a 
plurality or most of the favorable votes cast, without regard to withheld votes or 
votes cast against them.76 Under such a rule, in an uncontested election it would 
be possible for a director to be elected even if the overwhelming majority of 
shareholders withheld their votes against the director, because the plurality 
regime ensures that such a director is elected so long as she receives at least one 
vote in her favor.77 By contrast, majority voting ties director election results to 
 
71 See id. at 57, 69, 70-73. 
72 See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 46-47. 
73 See id. at 37-39. Compare Bebchuk, supra note 65, at 913-14 (arguing for increased 
shareholder power), with Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 4, at 558-60 
(suggesting that corporate directors are in best position to manage public companies), and 
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 659 (“[Corporate directors] are better informed than the 
shareholders and thus better positioned to take responsibility for both monitoring and 
managing the firm and its externalities.”). 
74 See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 37-39. 
75 See Fairfax, supra note 46, at 65-66. 
76 Id. at 63-64. 
77 See id. 
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obtaining a majority of the shareholder vote.78 Shareholders viewed plurality 
voting as undermining director accountability and shareholders’ ability to 
impact election outcomes.79 Spurred by this view, in 2005, shareholders began 
mobilizing to replace plurality voting with majority voting by filing a record 
number of shareholder proposals on the issue.80 Those proposals quickly began 
averaging fifty percent or more shareholder support.81 Shareholders’ efforts to 
dismantle plurality voting exemplify the new era of shareholder activism. 
2. Board Declassification 
Another critical element of shareholder activism has been aimed at board 
declassification. Board declassification refers to efforts to eliminate classified or 
staggered boards—that is, boards in which only a percentage of directors are 
elected each year—and replace them with boards that are elected annually.82 
Shareholders consider classified boards to be an entrenchment mechanism 
aimed at undermining their voting power by weakening their ability to replace 
the entire board in one election cycle.83 Shareholders and their advocates 
vigorously pushed for board declassification.84 The average shareholder support 
for board declassification has topped fifty percent for over a decade (and has 
often averaged close to seventy to eighty percent of the shareholder vote).85 Like 
majority voting, shareholders’ efforts to enact annual elections not only 
 
78 There are essentially two forms of majority voting regimes. See id. at 64-66. In a “true 
majority voting” regime, director nominees must receive a majority of the shareholder vote 
to be elected. See id. at 64. Under a “plurality plus” regime, plurality voting remains the 
default, but when a director fails to receive a majority of the vote, she must tender her 
resignation, and the board has some period of time (typically ninety days) to determine if it 
will accept the resignation. See id. at 65. 
79 See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 88-90; Fairfax, supra note 46, at 63. 
80 See Fairfax, supra note 46, at 61-70. 
81 See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 90; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 10, at 5. 
82 See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 80. 
83 See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 828. 
84 One pivotal board declassification advocate has been Harvard Professor Lucian 
Bebcheck. Professor Behchuck established the Shareholder Rights Project, a clinical and 
academic program at Harvard Law School that worked with insitutional investors to submit 
close to two hundred shareholder proposals aimed at dismantling classified boards. See K.J. 
Cremers & Simone Sepe, Board Declassification Activism: The Financial Value of the 
Shareholder Rights Project 6-8 (June 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstra 
ct=2962162. The strength of this advocacy work is highlighted not only by its success, but 
also by the fact that in 2015, once the Shareholder Rights Project stopped submitting 
proposals, the number of submissions declined significantly. See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 
LLP, 2015 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 9 (2015), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publicat 
ions/SC_Publication_2015_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/R32B-FZMQ]. 
85 See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 81; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2018 PROXY SEASON 
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highlight their desire to make boards more accountable to shareholders, but also 
symbolize shareholders’ willingness to abandon apathy. 
3. Supermajority Voting 
Supermajority voting refers to rules that require that certain fundamental 
transactions receive more than a simple majority shareholder vote in order to be 
approved. Shareholders view these rules as inhibiting their voting power. 
Shareholders contend that dismantling supermajority vote rules will give them a 
greater voice in critical corporate actions including amendments to the charter 
and bylaws, removal of directors, and approval of fundamental transactions such 
as mergers and acquisitions.86  
Thus, shareholders have sought to displace supermajority rules with those that 
would enable such transactions to be approved with a simple majority vote. 
Proposals related to supermajority rules have been very popular and have 
garnered significant shareholder support. As one commentator noted, “When 
these proposals come to vote, they usually pass.”87 Thus, shareholder support 
for altering supermajority votes averaged seventy-three percent in 2018, 
seventy-four percent in 2017, and sixty percent in 2016.88  
Board declassification, majority voting, and supermajority proposals have 
been the three most common shareholder proposals, as well as the three 
proposals most likely to garner significant shareholder support.89 The strength 
and success of campaigns related to such proposals reflect the growing trend 
toward embracing shareholder activism over apathy. 
4. Proxy Access 
Many shareholders and their advocates have long viewed proxy access (a rule 
that would enable shareholders to nominate candidates of their choice on the 
corporation’s proxy statement) as pivotal to shareholders’ ability to 
meaningfully exercise their voting power.90 Thus, shareholders have sought 
proxy access for decades.91 In the past, federal law prohibited shareholders from 
using the shareholder proposal process to advance proxy access.92 However, in 
2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) passed two proxy 
access rules—one that mandated proxy access and one that allowed shareholders 
 
86 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 84, at 21. 
87 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 11 (2017), https://www. 
sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2017_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ADU2-U75D]. 
88 Id.; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 21. 
89 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 22; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 
supra note 10, at 5. 
90 See FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 130. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. at 128. 
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to submit proxy access shareholder proposals.93 The Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit overturned the mandated proxy access rule, but left untouched the 
SEC rule allowing shareholders to submit proxy access bylaws.94 Beginning in 
2015, proxy access became the most popular shareholder proposal submitted, 
with the number of submissions skyrocketing by over four hundred percent from 
2014 to 2105.95 By 2017, proxy access had become the most prominent of 
shareholder proposals and the proposal that received the highest level of 
majority support.96 Thus, it received average shareholder support of fifty-eight 
percent in 2017, fifty-one percent of the vote in 2016,97 and fifty-five perent in 
2015.98 By 2018, the number of proxy access proposals had dropped due 
primarily to the “widespread and continued adoption of proxy access bylaws at 
larger companies.”99 
B. Votes Against Managerial Preferences 
To the extent that the hallmark of shareholder apathy is shareholders’ 
overwhelming tendency to vote in a manner consistent with managerial 
preferences, shareholders have recently rebuked that hallmark in several ways. 
First, there has been a rise in shareholder willingness to reject directors. This 
includes an increase in the number of directors against whom shareholders 
withhold their vote, 100 as well as an increase in the number of directors who 
receive less than a majority of the vote.101 To be sure, the overall percentage of 
directors who do not receive an overwhelming majority of the shareholder vote 
remains relatively small.102 Some have construed this to mean that majority 
voting has no impact or otherwise that shareholders are not willing to exercise 
 
93 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2018); FAIRFAX, supra note 6, at 131, 136-37. 
94 See Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
95 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 84, at 4. 
96 See GIBSON DUNN, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 2018 PROXY 
SEASON 4-6 (2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/shareholder-
proposal-developments-during-the-2018-proxy-season.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXT3-UUFH]. 
97 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 87, at 6. 
98 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 84, at 4. 
99 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 16. 
100 See Proxy Insight, Board of the Dead, PROXY MONTHLY, Nov. 2017, at 7; KOSMAS 
PAPADOPULOS, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., AN EARLY LOOK AT THE US 2018 PROXY 




101 See Proxy Insight, supra note 100, at 7. 
102 See id. 
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their voting authority.103 However, the mere fact that shareholders are willing to 
defy management—even if in only a handful of cases—underscores their 
activism. Then too, the data related to director elections could indicate 
shareholders’ judicious use of their director election power, rather than an 
unwillingness to use it.104 Second, there has been a rise in proxy contests coupled 
with a rise in shareholder support of those contests, and hence in shareholder 
success in such contests.105 Commentators characterized the historical lack of 
proxy contests and shareholder support for those contests as a key symbol of 
shareholder apathy. By sharp contrast, the growth in proxy contests and the 
related growth in the success of such contests is a strong indicator of activism. 
Third, there has been a rise in shareholder support of shareholder proposals.106 
As Section II.A revealed, many shareholder proposals have begun receiving a 
majority of the shareholder vote, with some votes being well in excess of a 
simple majority. This rise is a critical signal of activism. The vast majority of 
shareholder proposals are accompanied by a recommendation from the board to 
vote against the proposal. Shareholders’ willingness to ignore that 
recommendation runs counter to the apathy narrative, highlighting the shift away 
from that narrative. 
 
103 See Stephen Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1122, 1128 (2016); William K. Sjostrom & Young Kim, Majority Voting 
for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 469 (2007). 
104 See Choi et al., supra note 103, at 1132-33, 1173 (discussing shareholder restraint 
hypothesis and evidence of shareholder restraint); Sjostrom & Kim, supra note 103, at 468-
69 (“This real risk of losing the election would in turn ‘make directors more accountable to 
shareholders.’”). 
105 See Activist Insight, Taking Care of Business: A Look at Shareholder Activism in 2014 
and Beyond, in ACTIVIST INVESTING: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM 8, 11 (2015), http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20150130_Activis 
tInsight-SRZ.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YN8-BX7S] (discussing record number of activist 
campaigns in 2014); Martin Lipton, Watchell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Some Thoughts for 
Boards of Directors in 2015, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 2, 
2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/12/02/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-
2015/ [https://perma.cc/5HML-3NPZ] (noting that “[t]he number of activist attacks has 
surged from 27 in 2000 to nearly 250 year-to-date in 2014, in addition to numerous 
undisclosed behind-the-scenes situations”); Warren S. de Wied, Proxy Contests, PRAC. L.J., 
Nov. 2010, at 32, 33, https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/dewied1110.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X7DZ-F2RW] (noting that over the past ten years there has been an eighty-
seven percent increase in frequency of proxy contests); see also LAZARD’S S’HOLDER 
ADVISORY GRP., 2017 ACTIVISM YEAR IN REVIEW 2 (2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/ 
450414/lazards-review-of-shareholder-activism-q4-2017pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDE5-
45AP]; Anthony Garcia, In Proxy Voting, Public Disclosures Often Lead to Private 
Agreements, FACTSET INSIGHT (Jan. 5, 2015), https://insight.factset.com/in-proxy-voting-
public-disclosures-often-lead-to-private-agreements [https://perma.cc/R3JC-WX5Q] 
(showing general rise in proxy fights and a “high watermark” in 2009). 
106 See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 1 (noting that average support for proposals has 
increased almost four percentage points). 
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C. Engagement Activities 
Shareholders’ lack of engagement, coupled with their apparent lack of interest 
in engagement, has been replaced by increased calls for engagement. This 
replacement is yet another indicator of the demise of shareholder apathy. 
1.  Shareholder Proposals 
In contrast to the apathy era in which very few shareholder proposals were 
submitted or supported, there has been a steady growth in this area. In the last 
decade, shareholders have submitted a record number of corporate governance 
proposals aimed at enhancing their influence over director elections and 
corporate affairs.107 Moreover, there has been significant growth in shareholder 
support for those proposals.108 
2. Beyond Proposals 
There also has been a steady rise in shareholder calls for increased 
engagement with the board and officers outside of the proposal process and the 
annual meeting.109 Studies reveal that twenty-five years ago, the topic of 
shareholder communication outside of the limited platform of shareholder 
proposals had not yet surfaced.110 By comparison, current interactions between 
 
107 Over the last decade, there have been several years where the total number of 
shareholder proposals filed reached record highs. Even as the overall number of proposals 
have declined in the last two or three years, shareholder support for such proposals has 
increased. See id. at 2. A record high volume of shareholder proposals was reached in 2008 
and 2009; 2012 and 2013 also showed an increased volume. See EY CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, 
LET’S TALK: GOVERNANCE: 2014 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 6 (July 2014), http://www.ey.com/ 
Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-proxy-season-review/$FILE/ey-proxy-season-review.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7AW3-XSQC] (noting in recent years the number of shareholder proposals 
submissions have been at an “all-time high”); Matteo Tonello, The Conference Bd., Proxy 
Voting Analytics (2009-2013), HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 
26, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/26/proxy-voting-analytics-2009-2013/ 
[https://perma.cc/UM9S-7MYD]; Matteo Tonello, The Conference Bd., Proxy Voting 
Analytics (2008-2012), HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 24, 2013), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/24/proxy-voting-analytics-2008-2012/ [https://per 
ma.cc/D2U5-WJ3A]. There was a slight decline in 2017 and 2018, but there was also an 
increase in shareholder support for proposals. See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 3. 
108 See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 1. 
109 See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 833; James Kim & Jason D. Schloetzer, Conference Bd., 
Global Trends in Board-Shareholder Engagement, DIRECTOR NOTES 1 (Oct. 2013), 
https://www.conference-board.org/publications/publicationdetail.cfm?publicationid=2618 
[https://perma.cc/M3JF-7A4W]. 
110 See Susan S. Boren et al., Spencer Stuart, Why They Still Do It: Directors’ Motivations 
for Joining a Board, POINT OF VIEW: A SPECIAL ISSUE FOCUSING ON TODAY’S BOARD & CEO 
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shareholders and boards are on the rise.111 Boards report a rising increase in 
contact from shareholders regarding specific governance-related topics.112 In 
2018, seventy-seven percent of S&P 500 companies disclosed engaging with 
shareholders over the previous years, which was up from fifty-six percent in 
2015.113 Moreover, director involvement in such engagement has increased. In 
2015, less than ten percent of S&P 500 companies indicated that their directors 
were involved in engagement efforts with shareholders.114 In 2018, over a 
quarter of S&P 500 companies so indicated.115 A 2018 National Association of 
Corporate Directors (“NACD”) study found that for the first time, a majority of 
their respondents had a board representative meet with institutional shareholders 
in the prior year.116 As another study emphasized, “outreach to and direct 
engagement with shareholders cements itself as a key feature of the governance 
landscape.”117 
An NACD report notes that while communications between directors and 
shareholders is not a new idea, it has become a new and urgent priority.118 
Engagement outside of the annual meeting and shareholder proposal process is 
perhaps more remarkable because it reveals that shareholders are not simply 
active but are active year-round. The rise in engagement is another indictor of 





111 See SPENCER STUART, 2017: SPENCER STUART U.S. BOARD INDEX 7, 33 (2017), 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/ssbi2017/ssbi_2017_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JK 
5-J3FB] (noting increase of engagement from thirty-nine percent in 2016 to fifty-five percent 
in 2017). 
112 See id. (noting that fifty-five percent of boards (versus thirty-nine percent in 2016) 
reported being contacted by large institional investors or their largest shareholders to discuss 
governance related issues). 
113 See EY CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, 2018 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 4 (July 2018), https://ww 
w.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-cbm-proxy-season-review-2018/$FILE/EY-cbm-
proxy-season-review-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8YZ-JK59]. 
114 See id. 
115 See id.; SPENCER STUART, supra note 111, at 34 (noting that many shareholders engage 
directly with directors and the CEO, rather than investor relations officer of general counsel). 
116 See NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., supra note 8, at 3. Most of those meetings include the 
board chair or lead director. See id. 
117 See EY CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, supra note 113, at 4. 
118 Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Board-Shareholder Communications, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRECTORS (2014), https://www.nacdonline.org/insights/publications. 
cfm?ItemNumber=682 [https://perma.cc/BQ7D-WGL7] (“Few priorities are more urgent for 
boards today than communicaiton with their shareholders. The need for engagement, 
however, is not a recent addition to leading governance issues.”); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF 
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No one can question the fact that public company shareholders today are far 
from apathetic. They vote. They vote against management preferences, looking 
to unseat directors and alter corporate policies and practices. They engage. They 
engage year-round. Shareholder apathy, as a descriptive matter, appears to be 
dead. Instead, as the NACD aptly notes, “year-round shareholder activism” is 
becoming the “new norm in the American boardroom.”119 
III. ACTIVISM AS THE NEW NORM 
The descriptive shift has been accompanied by a normative shift. 
Shareholders as well as corporate officers and directors have rejected the 
propriety of apathy and embraced the appropriateness of activism, at least at 
some level and for some shareholders. In other words, shareholder activism has 
emerged as the new corporate governance norm. What does this norm 
encompass? It encompasses the belief that shareholders should actively engage 
with the corporation by using their vote to influence corporate elections and 
other corporate governance matters. The norm also encompasses the belief that 
shareholders should actively engage with corporations by engaging—and 
thereby communicating—with corporate officers and directors on a regular 
basis. Both of these beliefs run counter to the apathy norm while symbolizing a 
preference for activism. 
A. The Shareholder Shift 
The very fact that shareholders not only have engaged in campaigns aimed at 
augmenting their voting power, but also have used that voting power to alter 
corporate boards, practices and procedures, and to influence corporate policies, 
demonstrates a clear shift in shareholders’ normative understanding of their 
role.120 Historically, governance experts pointed to the fact that shareholders 
were not active as clear evidence that shareholders did not believe that they 
ought to be active. In this respect, shareholder apathy itself served as the 
compelling evidence that shareholders had a normative preference for apathy. In 
this same vein, shareholders’ activism can be viewed as evidence of their 
normative preference for such activism.  
The historically strong embrace of apathy further underscores this evidence, 
making shareholders’ shift towards activism especially remarkable. Evidence 
suggested that shareholders continued to embrace the apathy norm even when it 
 
119 Director Essentials: Preparing the Board for Shareholder Activism: Executive 
Summary, NAT’L ASS’N CORP. DIRECTORS (2018), https://www.nacdonline.org/insights/publi 
cations.cfm?ItemNumber=62968 [https://perma.cc/ASG9-UDWP]. 
120 Through say on pay, shareholders also have used their ability to vote to influence 
corporate packages related to compensation. See Jill Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 101, 102 (2018). 
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was no longer rational for them to do so.121 Hence, once institutional 
shareholders dominated the public company shareholder landscape, 
undermining the extent to which public company shareholders were dispersed, 
the narrative of rational apathy based on collective action and free-rider concerns 
seemed less sanguine.122 Nevertheless, shareholders remained apathetic. Some 
suggested that one reason for this continued embrace of apathy was 
shareholders’ continued belief that activism was not normatively appropriate.123 
This means that the apathy norm was so powerful that shareholders continued to 
embrace it even when such embrace may not have been in their best interests. 
From this perspective, shareholders’ embrace of activism in light of the 
historical dominance of apathy as the normative preference not only indicates 
that shareholders have consciously decided to embrace such activism, but also 
that they have consciously made the choice that activism is preferable to apathy. 
Shareholders’ desire for engagement with corporate actors is also compelling 
evidence of the normative embrace of shareholder activism. Indeed, apathy was 
typified by shareholders’ apparent desire to remain voiceless. Consistent with 
this desire is the fact that shareholder communication with the corporation in 
general, and the board in particular, especially outside of the annual meeting, 
was virtually unheard of.124 Now however, shareholder communication with the 
corporation has become standard practice: “Shareholders increasingly want to 
engage with boards on a range of governance issues, including succession, 
compensation, risk oversight and other concerns.”125 Shareholders have 
requested, and in some cases demanded, opportunities to interact with directors 
and officers.126 The fact that shareholders specifically reach out to corporations 
reflects their rejection of apathy and their normative belief that they should be 
actively engaging with corporations.  
Yet another indicator of the normative acceptance of shareholder activism can 
be seen in the rationale for shareholders’ voting behavior in director elections. 
To be sure, the fact that shareholders vote in such elections, and that they are 
willing to withhold their vote against certain directors, undercuts the apathy 
narrative. As mentioned in Section II.B, shareholders continue to vote for most 
directors and in large percentages. However, such voting behavior does not 
negate the fact that shareholders clearly believe that they should have enhanced 
voting rights—as evidenced by their fight to obtain majority voting. Also, it does 
not negate the notion that directors may be receiving such strong vote totals 
 
121 See Black, supra note 2, at 563-64. 
122 See id. at 563; Romano, supra note 46, at 795, 822. 
123 See Black, supra note 2, at 522. 
124 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. 
125 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 111, at 7 (emphasis added). 
126 See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 822. 
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because they are viewed as responsive to shareholders.127 But most telling are 
the reasons why shareholders decide to withhold their votes. The primary reason 
why shareholders will withhold their vote against directors is directors’ 
perceived lack of responsiveness to shareholder concerns.128 The percentage of 
directors who receive less than a majority support is very low, but it is “relatively 
significant” for those directors deemed to be unresponsive to shareholder 
concerns.129 Governance experts have noted that shareholders take this issue 
“particularly seriously.”130 This suggests that shareholders believe directors 
should be responsive to them. Such a belief is incompatible with the notion that 
shareholders should be apathetic. Such a belief, therefore, reflects shareholders’ 
embrace of activism and the appropriateness of shareholder influence. 
1. Everybody’s In 
Shareholder acceptance of activism is further highlighted by the fact that a 
broad spectrum of shareholders has embraced activism. If only a limited number 
or type of shareholder were engaging in activism, that fact would undermine the 
notion that public shareholders as a group have rejected apathy in favor of 
activism.  
At first glance, evidence suggests that this may be the case. For example, 
shareholder proposals are often submitted by a relatively small group of 
shareholders.131 Three individuals are responsible for over forty percent of 
shareholder proposal submissions and the vast majority of shareholder 
governance-related proposals.132 Moreover, not only are a small number of 
entities responsible for shareholder proposal submissions from institutional 
shareholders, but also the same type of institutional shareholder—the public 
pension fund—submits the large majority of shareholder proposals.133 In this 
regard, it could be suggested that focusing on the number of shareholder 
proposals as a reflection of activism may be misleading.  
However, this suggestion is incorrect. First, shareholder support of 
shareholder proposals has risen significantly during this era, with many 
proposals receiving a majority and at times well over a majority of shareholder 
 
127 See Choi et al., supra note 103, at 1123, 1130 (disucssing deterrence or accountability 
hypothesis); Sjostrom & Kim, supra note 103, at 468-69. 
128 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 87, at 2. 
129 See id. at 23 (reporting twenty-three percent of directors received less than majority 
support). 
130 See id. at 27. 
131 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 3-4. 
132 See id. at 4. 
133 See id. For many, the fact that public pension funds submit shareholder proposals may 
be viewed as unremarkable because such funds historically have been the primary 
shareholders responsible for shareholder proposal submissions. 
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support.134 Public pension fund holdings fall well short of a majority. Thus, this 
majority support stems from other shareholders within the corporation, 
reflecting a broad base of support among all shareholders. Commentators have 
concurred that the broad level of support for many shareholder proposals can be 
characterized as an increase in traction among other types of institutional 
shareholders.135  
Second, the fact that other shareholders have made the decision to support the 
actions of pension funds is itself a sign of an embrace of activism as an 
appropriate corporate governance mechanism. Traditionally, pension fund 
activism was viewed with skepticism.136 Shareholders viewed pension funds’ 
behavior as inappropriate because they were seeking to step out of their 
normatively appropriate role and become more active.137 As a consequence, 
many shareholders were leery of aligning themselves with pension fund 
activism. The fact that shareholders are now willing to align themselves with 
activism led by such funds is testament to the fact that more shareholders have 
now come to view activism as acceptable and appropriate. 
Similarly, some have insisted that activism is limited to hedge funds, whose 
activism many view as problematic and unacceptable.138 Indeed, often the main 
proponents of proxy contests are hedge funds. Moreover, hedge funds have been 
particularly aggressive in this new era of activism, causing companies to engage 
in practices that many have suggested are not in the best interests of the 
corporation.139 However, similar to the shareholder proposal context, hedge 
funds have not acted alone. Instead, they have managed to win proxy contests 
and other activist campaigns by garnering the support of other shareholders. 
Hence, while hedge funds may have led the charge, the fact that other 
shareholders support them is strong evidence for the activism norm. Indeed, the 
fact that other shareholders align themselves with shareholders, such as hedge 
funds, that have openly and unapologetically embraced the activism norm is very 
 
134 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
135 See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 1. 
136 See Romano, supra note 46, at 796. 
137 See id. at 797. 
138 Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An 
Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 723 (2007); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge 
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1028 
(2007); Lipton, supra note 105. 
139 See Stout, supra note 3, at 1184; Lipton, supra note 105. To be sure, there are studies 
that have refuted the claim that hedge funds have been detrimental to the corporation and its 
shareholders. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of 
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2015); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth 
That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1640-41 (2013); 
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strong evidence that other shareholders have begun to view that norm as 
beneficial and acceptable. 
Then too, the embrace of activism is even more significant because the 
shareholders traditionally viewed as most likely to embrace apathy also have 
endorsed activism. Today, mutual funds and other asset managers have become 
increasingly vocal in their support and affirmation of shareholder activism as an 
appropriate governance tool.140 Mutual funds and asset managers were viewed 
as shareholders most likely to endorse the apathy norm. However, even these 
shareholders have become more active. Moreover, even these shareholders have 
affirmatively chosen to align themselves with shareholders, such as hedge funds 
and public pension funds, that are viewed as symbolizing the propriety of 
activism.141 
2. No More Rubber Stamps? 
Another key indicator of the normative acceptance of activism is the fact that 
shareholders are willing to go against management and their recommendations. 
For many, the sin qua non of shareholder apathy rested in the fact that 
shareholders rubber-stamped managerial preferences.142 By contrast, 
shareholders today are challenging those preferences. The success of proxy 
contests is the most compelling example of this phenomenon because it reflects 
shareholders’ willingness to vote against directors. Shareholders’ support of 
shareholder proposals also highlights the shareholder activism norm as 
shareholders have demonstrated their willingness to repeatedly vote against 
management recommendations in very large numbers.  
3. Proxy Advisors 
Some might say that shareholders’ voting behaviors are not the product of 
shareholder choice, but instead reflect the choice of others—proxy advisory 
 
140 See LAZARD’S S’HOLDER ADVISORY GRP., supra note 105, at 1, 9 (noting rise in index 
funds’ willingness to support dissidents in proxy fights); SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra 
note 85, at 4; Tony Boyd, Larry Fink Says BlackRock Will Take Activism to a ‘Whole New 
Level,’ FIN. REV. (Nov. 1, 2017, 5:54 AM), https://www.afr.com/business/larry-fink-says-
blackrock-will-take-activism-to-a-whole-new-level-20171031-gzc2lt [https://perma.cc/N3W 
8-G5WM]; Daniel Gross, Some Mutual Funds Are Joining the Activist Bandwagon, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/business/mut fund/some-
mutual-funds-are-joining-the-activist-bandwagon.html; Mutual Funds Joining Shareholder 
Activists in New Trend, VALUEWALK (Aug. 10, 2015, 12:27 PM), https://www.value 
walk.com/2015/08/mutual-funds-joining-shareholder-activists-in-new-trend/ [https://perma. 
cc/EX6V-SZPX]; Sawyer & Trevino, supra note 63 (noting rise in index support of dissident 
campaigns); Ryan Vlastelica, Passive Funds Aren’t Afraid to Throw Their Weight Around as 
Activists, MARKETWATCH (May 1, 2017, 3:07 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/pass 
ive-funds-arent-afraid-to-throw-their-weight-around-as-activists-2017-05-01 [https://perma. 
cc/9P5U-86R8]. 
141 See supra note 140. 
142 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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firms. Significant concerns have been raised about the influence of proxy 
advisory firms on shareholder voting.143 Evidence demonstrates that such firms 
have the ability to sway up to twenty percent of the shareholder vote.144 In this 
regard, it may be a misnomer to suggest that shareholder voting is reflective of 
their normative preferences. However, the reliance on proxy advisory firms is 
only further evidence of the shareholder activism norm. First, the mere fact that 
shareholders are seeking out guidance on how they should exercise their vote is 
evidence of rejection of the apathy norm, which presumes that shareholders have 
no desire to vote, let alone vote responsibly. Second, the mere fact that 
shareholders are choosing to vote or otherwise follow the directions of some 
entity other than directors is enough to undercut the apathy norm. Hence the 
reliance on such firms is further evidence of the acceptance of activism. 
B. The Corporate Shift 
1. By Their Own Conduct 
The fact that corporations have voluntarily implemented policies and 
procedures whose purpose is to increase shareholders’ voting power and 
influence reveals a normative acceptance of shareholder activism. This fact can 
be seen in a wave of acceptance. First, majority voting. In 2004, fewer than one 
hundred companies,145 and fewer than thirty S&P 500 companies, had majority 
voting regimes.146 Today, nearly ninety-three percent of S&P 500 companies 
have some form of majority vote regime.147 Second, board declassification. In 
2018, ninety-five percent of S&P 100 companies and ninety-two percent of S&P 
500 companies had declassified boards as compared to fifty-five percent of S&P 
500 companies in 2004.148 Third, proxy access. Only two companies had 
 
143 See Belinifanti, supra note 57, at 794; Fisch, Palia & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 
120, at 129. 
144 See Fisch, Palia & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 120, at 113-14. 
145 See Claudia H. Allen, Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections 10 n.9 (Nov. 12, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=24751 
22 (revealing around one hundred corporations with majority voting regimes before majority 
vote campaign began). 
146 See Brooke A. Masters, Shareholders Flex Muslces; Proxy Measures Pushing 
Corporate Accountability Gain Support, WASH. POST, June 17, 2006, at D1. 
147 Zombie Directors and Board Accountability, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP 
(July 16, 2014), http://www.rgrdlaw.com/news-item-Zombie-Directors-Board-Accountabilit 
y-071614.html [https://perma.cc/44KB-QNJW]; see also Marc S. Gerber, US Corporate 
Governance: Boards of Directors Face Increased Scrutiny, SKADDEN (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://www.skadden.com/insights/us-corporate-governance-boards-directors-face-increased-
scrutiny (reporting that as of January 2014, almost ninety percent of S&P companies had 
adopted a majority voting regime). 
148 See SPENCER STUART, 2018 UNITED STATES SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 15 (2018), 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2018/october/ssbi_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGG4 
-LHDR]; SPENCER STUART, 2014 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 15 (2014), 
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adopted proxy access in 2013.149 Only fifteen companies had proxy access prior 
to 2015.150 As of July 2017, over eighty-five percent of S&P 100 companies and 
over sixty percent of S&P 500 companies had adopted proxy access 
provisions.151 As of June 2018, over seventy percent of S&P 500 companies had 
adopted proxy access.152 
Individually and collectively, the board’s implementation of these 
procedures, clearly aimed at enhancing shareholder power and influence, 
appears to evidence a belief that such power and influence are appropriate. 
Shareholder proposals are non-binding and hence even if they receive a majority 
of the shareholder vote, the board is under no obligation to implement them. 
More importantly, boards historically have ignored shareholder votes in this 
area, choosing not to implement shareholder proposals even when they receive 
a majority of the vote.153 For example, empirical evidence reveals that corporate 
directors strenuously and repeatedly resisted shareholder efforts to declassify the 
board.154 Such directors refused to implement declassification even when a 
sizeable majority of shareholders approved proposals for declassification, and 
even when those proposals passed for several consecutive years in a row.155 In 
resisting implementation of such proposals, directors stressed their belief that 
declassification was not in the corporation’s best interests, at least in part based 
on the view that shareholder influence and activism was inappropriate.156 The 
shift in favor of implementation therefore appears to reflect an acceptance that 
such influence is appropriate.  
The fact that directors voluntarily implement proposals prior to any 
shareholder vote underscores the appearance of this belief. Most of the 2017 
proxy access proposals never even went to a vote.157 Instead, the proposals were 
withdrawn because companies voluntarily adopted proxy access provisions prior 
 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/PDF%20Files/Research%20and%20Insight 
%20PDFs/SSBI2014web14Nov2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/9C4T-Z99M]; David A. Bell, 
Corporate Governance Survey - 2018 Proxy Season Results, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Jan. 7, 
2019), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/corporate-governance-survey-2018-pro 
xy-season-results.aspx [https://perma.cc/X94Z-EWZX]. 
149 See Marc S. Gerber, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Proxy Access: 
Highlights of the 2017 Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(July 1, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/01/proxy-access-highlights-of-the-
2017-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/SJG3-LXBL]. 
150 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 87, at 9. 
151 See id. at 6. 
152 See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 18. To be sure, proxy access proposals centered 
on changes to the proxy access rules have received significantly less support than those 
seeking adoption of a proxy access rule. See id. 
153 See Bebchuk, supra note 65, at 854; Brownstein & Kirman, supra note 29, at 72. 
154 See Bebchuk, supra note 65, at 854. 
155 See id. 
156 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 10, at 5-6. 
157 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 87, at 1. 
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to any vote.158 Moreover, there has been a general increase in the number of 
withdrawn proposals as management works with shareholders to voluntarily 
adopt their proposals. Thus, in 2018, fifteen percent of shareholder proposals 
were withdrawn.159 Boards presumably understand that they have no obligation 
to implement these procedures. Their decision to do so can be viewed as an 
affirmation of their belief that doing so is in the corporation’s best interests and 
thus is normatively appropriate. 
Then too, the fact that directors affirmatively implement policies even when 
they do not receive a shareholder proposal further highlights their shift in 
viewpoint. Thus, many companies simply preemptively have adopted, and 
continue to adopt, shareholder policies and procedures aimed at empowering 
shareholders.160 
The fact that directors have affirmatively and actively reached out to their 
shareholders is another sign of their embrace of activism. In 2017, eighty-two 
percent of companies indicated that their board or management proactively 
reached out to the company’s largest shareholders.161 As this suggests, boards 
are not just willing to engage when asked, but also are affirmatively seeking out 
engagement because they believe it to be important. According to the 2017 
Spencer Stuart Board Index, “many boards value the opportunity to meet with 
shareholders.”162 The existence and prevalence of shareholder-board 
engagement stands in sharp contrast to the virtual absence of such engagement 
in the apathy era. This increased desire to engage with shareholders can be 
understood as a shifting understanding of the need for shareholder influence and 
insight, and thus the shift towards the activism norm. 
2. In Their Own Words 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence that boards have embraced the 
shareholder activism norm stems from their own words. I have reviewed 
hundreds of federal proxy statements. In those statements, boards of directors 
clearly have stated that they “believe” allowing shareholders to have greater 
voice and influence over corporate governance affairs is in the best interests of 
the corporation. Those statements also reflect directors’ views that consideration 
of shareholder perspective is an important aspect of good corporate governance. 
In other words, federal proxy statements of the many hundreds of companies 
 
158 See id. at 6. 
159 See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 5. 
160 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 87, at 10. 
161 See SPENCER STUART, supra note 111, at 7, 33. “The most common topics about which 
companies proactively engaged with shareholders were ‘say on pay’ and 
environmental/social/governance (ESG) (48% each), followed by board refreshment (43%).” 
Id. at 33. 
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that have adopted shareholder empowerment mechanisms are replete with 
language reflecting an embrace of the shareholder activism norm.  
The board of Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc. not only proposed its own proxy 
access bylaw, but later recommended approval of a proxy access bylaw proposed 
by shareholders.163 The Abercrombie shareholders’ supporting statement 
declared that proxy access “will make directors more accountable.”164 In 
response, the Abercrombie board stated that it had carefully considered the 
proposal and was recommending adoption because the board believed such a 
bylaw was “in the best interests of the Company and our stockholders.”165 The 
board’s response appeared to reflect their agreement with the notion that making 
the corporation more accountable to its shareholders was in the corporation’s 
best interest.  
In recommending that the shareholders support a proposal to declassify the 
board, the board of Banc of California, Inc. stated that it based its belief on the 
board’s outreach to investors, its understanding of corporate best practices, and 
its belief in the importance of shareholder accountability. The Banc board stated 
that it had carefully considered the issue, and after such consideration, the Banc 
board stated that it had determined that declassification was in the corporation’s 
best interests.166 The Banc board stated, “[A] classified structure may appear to 
reduce directors’ accountability to stockholders, since such a structure does not 
enable stockholders to express a view on director’s performance by means of an 
annual vote.”167 The Banc board also stated that it had engaged in outreach with 
its large shareholders who supported declassification.168 The Banc board then 
expressed its belief in the importance of adopting corporate governance best 
practices, before pointing out that majority voting had come to be viewed as a 
best practice.169 These statements not only reveal that the Banc board believes it 
is important to consider shareholder views, but also that the Banc board believes 
it is important for shareholders to be able to use their vote to enhance 
accountability. This also appears to reveal a belief in the normative 
appropriateness of being able to ensure shareholder accountability.  
According to the board of Barnes & Noble, Inc. (“B&N”), it recommended 
adoption of a declassified board structure because such a structure would 
enhance accountability to stockholders, ensure that stockholders have the 
capacity to influence corporate governance policies, and hold management 
 
163 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 134-135 (Apr. 26, 
2017). 
164 Id. at 134. 
165 Id. 
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accountable for implementing those policies.170 The B&N board pointed out that 
the company historically had believed that the classified board held advantages 
for the corporation.171 However, the B&N board stated that it had taken note of 
current corporate governance trends leading away from classified boards based 
on the importance of ensuring accountability to shareholders.172 The B&N board 
then stated that its institutional shareholders believed that director elections 
reflected “the primary means for shareholders to influence corporate governance 
policies.”173 The B&N board noted that it had carefully considered board 
declassification and held ongoing discussions with its institutional 
shareholders.174 Based on these considerations, the board concluded that 
declassification was in the corporation’s best interests.175 These statements 
reveal the B&N board’s belief that it should consider shareholder views as well 
as its belief that the board should ensure that shareholders are able to use their 
vote to hold directors accountable on matters related to corporate governance. 
These statements also make clear that the B&N board believes that it was in the 
corporation’s best interest to provide structures that allow for shareholder voice 
and influence.  
Other boards similarly have stated a belief in the appropriateness of 
shareholder influence along with the appropriateness of adopting corporate 
structures that allow for such influence. The board of Cutera, Inc. stated that, 
after careful consideration, it believed that declassification was in the best 
interests of the corporation and its stockholders because it would provide the 
stockholders with the “opportunity to register their views on the performance of 
the entire board each year and thereby enhance the board’s accountability to 
stockholders.”176 In recommending that shareholders approve majority voting, 
the board of Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. stated that the majority voting standard was 
in the corporation’s best interests because it would give shareholders a “greater 
voice” in determining board composition while reinforcing shareholder 
accountability to directors.177 The board of Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc. stated 
that it had decided to recommend approval of majority voting because it would 
“further enhance shareholder participation in the company’s corporate 
governance and director elections.”178  
 
170 See Barnes & Noble, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 68-69 (Aug. 7, 2017). 





176 See Cutera, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 17 (May 1, 2017). 
177 See Diebold Nixdorf, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 44 (Mar. 13, 2017). 
178 See Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 6 (Sept. 11, 
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The weight given to shareholders’ views is apparent even in disagreements 
between boards and shareholders. Some boards acknowledged, for example, that 
they may disagree with shareholder concerns, but then stated that they would 
recommend adoption of shareholder-empowering mechanisms despite this 
disagreement based on their belief in the importance of considering 
shareholders’ views when establishing corporate governance practices and 
policies.179 Thus, the board of United Rentals, Inc. stated the following: 
The Board continues to believe that the retention of the Company’s existing 
supermajority voting requirements for certain fundamental changes to the 
Company’s corporate governance provides stockholders with very 
meaningful protections against actions that may not be in their best 
interests. On the other hand, the Board recognizes that certain stockholders 
and institutions disagree and believes that acknowledgement of this 
perspective is an important matter of corporate governance. 
Accordingly . . . the Board has determined to recommend a vote to approve 
the Simple Majority Amendment.180  
The fact that directors believe that they should advance shareholders’ voices 
in corporate governance matters even when they disagree with the mechanism 
related to such advancement strongly suggests boards’ embrace of a norm 
favoring shareholder influence over apathy. 
Collectively, the statements made by directors in federal proxy materials 
reveal that boards have come to believe that shareholder influence is normatively 
appropriate. These and similar statements from corporate boards reveal 
directors’ beliefs that enhanced shareholder voice is in the best interests of the 
corporation and the shareholders.181 They also indicate a belief that 
consideration of shareholder views represents a critical aspect of good corporate 
 
179 See United Rentals, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 74 (Mar. 21, 2017). 
180 Id. (emphasis added). 
181 See Esterline Technologies Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 46 (Dec. 27, 
2017) (recommending approval of board declassification proposal); Gamestop Corp., Proxy 
Statement (Form DEF14), at 46 (May 12, 2017) (recommending approval of proposal to 
eliminate supermajority because in it is in the best interests of corporation and shareholder); 
Polaris Indus. Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 52 (Mar. 10, 2017) (recommending 
adoption of majority voting because in it is in the “best interests” of corporation and 
shareholders); Hain Celestial Foods Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 25 (Oct. 16, 
2017) (recommending approval of proxy access bylaws); Sabre Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 
DEF14), at 31-32 (Apr. 7, 2017) (recommending approval of majority vote standard because 
it is in the best interests of corporation and shareholders); Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc., supra 
note 178, at 6-7 (recommending elimination of cumulative voting coupled with adoption of 
majority voting standard); Williams-Sonoma, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 26 
(Apr. 19, 2017) (recommending approval of proxy access because it is in the best interest of 
company and consistent with sound corporate governance practices); Willis Towers Watson 
Pub. Ltd. Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 89-90 (Apr. 27, 2017) (recommending 
approval of proxy access). 
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governance.182 Finally, they indicate a belief that the corporate governance norm 
has shifted away from apathy and towards shareholder activism.183  
C. A Norm but Not Normative? 
1. Pressure vs. Preference 
Some may resist the assertion that directors have embraced the shareholder 
activism norm, based on the notion that directors have acceded to shareholders 
because of shareholder pressure rather than any affirmative preference for 
activism over apathy. Indeed, some have criticized shareholder activism based 
on their concern that shareholders have pressured directors to take actions 
despite directors’ belief that such actions are not in the corporation’s best 
interests.184 Such critics contend that directors have bowed to the demands of 
shareholders with special interests even when those interests do not align with 
the interests of the broader shareholder class.185 Others imply that directors have 
focused on shareholders with short-term interests or otherwise have focused on 
short-term goals despite their desire to focus on the corporation’s long-term 
health and sustainability.186 Such criticisms imply that directors have acquiesced 
to shareholder demands not because they agree with them, but rather because 
they feel pressured, coerced, or even blackmailed.187 This critique negates any 
inference that director adoption of shareholder empowering mechanisms reflect 
their embrace in the propriety of such power or those mechanisms.  
 
182 See Esterline Technologies Corp., supra note 181, at 45 (stating that board had 
considered fact that their institutional shareholders perceived annual elections as increasing 
accountability of directors to shareholders). 
183 See id.  
184 See LISA A. FONTENOT ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION 
RULES § 10.01 (6th ed. 2019) (noting that companies frequently are “bowing to the wishes” 
of activists or reaching compromises); Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 4, at 1755-
56 (noting that because managers are risk averse, they may give in to blackmail even when 
proposals have little chance of passage); Bebchuk, supra note 65, at 885 (recognizing but 
rejecting blackmail argument); Editorial Bd., Opinion, When Shareholder Activism Goes Too 
Far, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-
04-10/when-shareholder-activism-goes-too-far (noting that some “hyperactivists” have 
coerced companies into engaging in actions focused on short-term “instant gratification,” and 
noting that these actions reflect companies “taking the easy path” of giving in rather than 
explaining their investment strategies to shareholders); Lipton, supra note 105. 
185 See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 561, 577 (2006); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor 
Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE L.J. ON REG. 174, 231-
32 (2001). 
186 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 657-59; Stout, supra note 3, at 1180-81; 
Lipton, supra note 105. 
187 See MACGREGOR, supra note 10 (claiming that shareholders have been allowed to 
“hijack” the corporation); SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 10, at 6 (suggesting that 
some corporate changes may be result of coercion); Rock, supra note 10, at 1922 (noting that 
majority voting has “swept the field with boards caving in to shareholder demands”). 
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However, in contrast to these suggestions, when directors adopt shareholder 
empowering mechanisms, they profess a belief in their propriety. As noted in 
Section III.B.2 above, federal proxy statements are filled with language 
reflecting an embrace of the shareholder activism norm. These statements 
indicate that directors believe that shareholders should exercise their voting 
authority to hold directors accountable and influence corporate governance 
matters. These statements also indicate directors’ beliefs that governance 
structures should be designed to facilitate such exercise. These statements 
therefore undermine the notion that directors’ actions do not reflect a belief in 
the propriety of shareholder empowerment. Instead, these statements reflect 
directors’ stated embrace of shareholder activism as an appropriate component 
of corporate governance.  
2. Preemption vs. Preference 
Some may disagree with the concept that directors’ acquiescence to 
shareholder activism reflects their embrace of such activism, based on the notion 
that directors’ acquiescence serves as a preemptive strike. Based on this 
disagreement, it could be argued that directors have made the decision to 
voluntarily implement shareholder empowering devices in order to prevent more 
intrusive devices that may be recommended by shareholders. Indeed, under the 
federal proposal rules, if directors implement their own bylaw related to a 
particular corporate governance matter—such as majority voting or proxy 
access—they can prevent shareholders from including a proposal addressing a 
bylaw related to the same matter.188 Some corporations have successfully 
excluded shareholder proposals on this basis.189 Moreover, these exclusions 
often occur under circumstances in which shareholders view the corporate 
proposal as less empowering than their own proposal.190 Some may therefore 
argue that to the extent directors have chosen to implement shareholder-
empowering procedures in this manner, their choice may not be characterized as 
an embrace of the shareholder activism norm. 
However, this argument misses the point for at least two reasons. First, even 
if directors choose to adopt empowering devices as a preemptive strike, they 
nevertheless use rhetoric indicating that their adoption does aim to provide 
shareholders with enhanced voting power and authority. From this perspective, 
while directors’ actions may reflect a disagreement with the shareholders 
regarding the appropriate mechanism by which to confer power, they 
nevertheless confirm the crucial norm, embracing a belief that the augmentation 
of such power is appropriate and in the corporation’s best interests. In other 
words, directors’ words and actions acknowledge the propriety of shareholder 
power, even if they indicate disagreement about the contours of that power. 
Second, it is possible that directors’ actions can best be understood as a reflection 
 
188 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 14. 
189 See id. 
190 See id. 
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of a cost-benefit analysis, pursuant to which directors have made the decision 
that it is more beneficial to grant shareholders power under mechanisms 
prescribed by directors rather than by shareholders. Many of the directors’ 
statements in federal proxy statements claimed that directors have engaged in a 
careful consideration of the benefits and drawbacks associated with augmented 
shareholder power.191 However, this cost-benefit analysis does not negate an 
embrace of shareholder activism. At a minimum, the cost-benefit analysis 
underscores directors’ belief that there are costs related to ignoring shareholder 
demands for greater influence. This analysis also reveals that directors believe 
it is normatively appropriate to consider shareholder influence and activism 
when making important governance decisions. The analysis further reveals 
directors’ belief that it is appropriate to put a thumb on the scale in favor of 
activism over apathy. In this regard, even the preemptive strike reflects an 
embrace of the activism norm. 
3. And Then There Were Hedge Funds 
To be sure, it is undeniable that many directors have not accepted the 
normative premise that hedge funds should be engaged in activism.192 Instead, 
most directors have indicated that they do not believe that shareholder 
empowerment, as wielded by many hedge funds, is in the corporation’s best 
interests or is otherwise normatively appropriate.193 
However, this indication does not undermine the shift away from apathy. 
Instead, it underscores the fact that directors have come to believe that 
shareholder power is appropriate for some (but not all) shareholders. 
Shareholder activism has highlighted the fact that shareholders have different 
characteristics and agendas.194 It is clear that directors have embraced the 
propriety of activism, but only with respect to certain shareholders. Thus, 
through their words and actions, most directors have indicated that they believe 
activism is appropriate for those shareholders with a long-term interest in the 
company or otherwise for those shareholders who do not engage in “short-
termism.”195 Indeed, even vocal hedge fund activism opponent Martin Lipton 
has begun working to facilitate engagement between public companies and 
institutional shareholders focused on the long term.196 This is a pivotal 
concession. Historically, directors appeared to accept the notion that shareholder 
 
191 See supra notes 163-181 and accompanying text (compiling proxy statements that 
deploy rhetoric of careful consideration). 
192 See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text (detailing debates over hedge fund 
activism). 
193 See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text (noting pushback against hedge fund 
activism). 
194 See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 46, at 1283-84. 
195 See Steven A. Rosenblum, Hedge Fund Activism, Short-Termism, and a New Paradigm 
of Corporate Governance, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 538, 542-43 (2017). 
196 See id. at 545. 
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apathy was appropriate for all categories of shareholders. Today, directors 
appear to believe influence by certain shareholders is appropriate and preferable 
to apathy.  
4. The Reality of the Rhetoric 
Some may contend that this Article’s reliance on directors’ words is 
misplaced because such words are mere window-dressing and cannot be used as 
any indication of directors’ actual normative beliefs. This contention is 
problematic for at least three reasons. First, directors’ words and behaviors 
historically represented the primary evidence used to support the proposition 
that directors had a normative preference for apathy. Why should directors’ 
words and behaviors have less sway as evidence to support the current 
preference for activism?  
Second, directors have a fiduciary obligation to take actions that they 
reasonably believe are in the best interests of the corporation.197 If their words 
are meaningless and therefore invalid, then should we believe that directors have 
adopted mechanisms that they do not believe are in the corporation’s best 
interest? If so, does this not suggest that directors have breached their fiduciary 
duty? Unless we concede that directors have breached their fiduciary duty, we 
must acknowledge that directors actually believe that their actions in embracing 
shareholder activism benefit the corporation and that such actions therefore are 
normatively appropriate. In federal proxy disclosures, directors clearly indicate 
that they have “carefully” considered the shareholder proposal as well as the 
arguments on both sides.198 Only after that consideration do directors 
affirmatively state their belief in the propriety of shareholder influence by 
recommending the adoption of particular procedures and policies. Directors’ 
statements related to their careful consideration suggest that directors are aware 
of their fiduciary duty and that their statements and conclusions reflect 
compliance with that duty. Any other characterization almost requires the 
conclusion that directors have breached their fiduciary duty. This Article insists 
that such a conclusion is not warranted. 
Third, if we believe that directors’ words are mere window-dressing, then we 
are also suggesting that directors may be committing securities fraud. The 
“rhetoric” being used by directors comes in the form of statements made in the 
federal proxy statement and other federal disclosure documents. Federal 
securities laws forbid making statements that are untrue or misleading in the 
 
197 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that boards’ exercise of corporate 
power begins with basic principle that corporate directors have fiduciary duty to act in best 
interest of corporation’s stockholders); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-812 (Del. 1984); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (a)-(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (detailing fiduciary duties of 
directors to shareholders). 
198 See supra notes 163-175. 
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proxy statement or in connection with a proxy solicitation.199 If directors have 
made statements that they do not actually believe, is that not tantamount to 
saying that directors have voluntarily committed securities fraud? Given the 
sophistication of directors and their counsel, this Article contends that it is more 
likely that directors actually believe the statements they have made in federal 
disclosure documents than that directors have consciously decided to engage in 
securities fraud. 
Based on these considerations, this Article insists that directors’ rhetoric is a 
reflection of their reality.  
5. The Holdouts 
There are some directors who have not embraced the shareholder activism 
norm. One example of this is Netflix, Inc. Netflix shareholders approved 
proposals for declassified boards at five consecutive annual meetings from 2012 
to 2016, with shareholder support ranging from seventy-five percent to eighty-
eight percent.200 Yet Netflix has consistently refused to implement board 
declassification.201 Similarly, Netflix shareholder proposals seeking a majority 
vote received more than eighty percent of the votes cast in three annual 
meetings.202 Yet Netflix has consistently refused to adopt a majority voting 
standard.203 Netflix directors appear to have a preference for apathy.  
However, Netflix (and companies similar to Netflix that have not embraced 
shareholder empowering mechanisms) only highlights the importance and 
significance of the actions and words of other directors. As Netflix clearly 
reveals, directors are free to ignore shareholder preferences if they believe doing 
so is in the corporation’s best interests. The fact that so many directors have 
chosen not to follow Netflix’s example underscores their own assessment that 
these empowering mechanisms are appropriate. In other words, Netflix 
represents the exception that only proves the norm. 
Moreover, the fact that some directors may disagree with the appropriateness 
of the activism norm does not negate the trend towards acceptance of the norm. 
Indeed, even when the apathy norm was dominant, there were instances of 
activism as well as some who disagreed with the norm.204 In other words, the 
 
199 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-6 (2018). 
200 See Netflix, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF14), at 25 (Apr. 24, 2017). 
201 See id. at 26. 
202 See id. at 25, 30. One of the reasons Netflix shareholders have cited when insisting that 
majority voting is necessary is that they believe the Netflix board is not being held accountable 
to its shareholders. According to the shareholder proposal, five of its directors received more 
than forty-eight percent negative votes. See id. Two of its directors failed to receive majority 
vote and remained on the board. Id. 
203 See id. at 30. 
204 See supra Sections I.B, C (discussing history of activism and criticism of apathy norm 
during era of apathy). 
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norm has never been universal. Instead, like with this current era, it represented 
the dominant understanding of how shareholders should behave. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
Recently there have been developments seeking to undermine shareholder 
activism. In particular, there have been developments in the capital markets 
designed to mute the impact of shareholders’ influence, such as the re-
emergence of dual-class stock and the increase in companies remaining private, 
thereby avoiding the public market and its attendant shareholder activism. At the 
federal level, several laws have been proposed that are designed to mute the 
impact of shareholder influence, including laws altering the shareholder 
proposal rules as well as laws seeking to amend say on pay provisions. This Part 
analyzes these developments to assess what, if any, impact they are likely to 
have on the shareholder activism norm. 
A. Snap and Dual-Class Stock 
Some companies have made the decision to issue stock to the public with 
reduced voting rights. In its 2017 initial public offering (“IPO”), Snap Inc. issued 
stock to the public with no voting rights.205 To be sure, Snap represents an 
extreme and hence no other company has made the decision to completely 
eliminate voting rights for its public shareholders.206 However, some companies 
have made the decision to issue stock with unequal voting rights. This 
phenomenon, known as dual- or multi-class shares, occurs when a company 
splits its stock into different categories and gives owners of one class greater 
voting rights than owners of the other.207 Such a structure allows a small group 
of shareholders, typically the founders or key insiders, to retain control of the 
business.208 When a public company has dual-class stock, it means that the 
voting power of the publicly held stock is less than that of the stock held by 
private investors, which generally includes company founders and other 
insiders.209 For example, at Facebook, Inc., the Class B shares have ten times the 
voting rights of the Class A shares.210 The Class B shares are held by Mark 
 
205 Ken Bertsch, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, Snap and the Rise of No-Vote Common 
Shares, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 26, 2017), https://corpgov 
.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/26/snap-and-the-rise-of-no-vote-common-shares/ [https://perma.c 
c/BX4T-PNDW]. 
206 See id. 
207 See id.; CFA INST., DUAL-CLASS SHARES: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 1 (2018), 
https://www.cii.org/files/misc_files/CFAI-Dual%20Class%20Shares-05092018v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YY9M-D93X]. 
208 See CFA INST., supra note 207, at 8; Bertsch, supra note 205. 
209 See CFA INST., supra note 207, at 1. 
210 See Bob Pisani, Shareholders Won’t Force Zuckerberg’s Hand in Facebook 
Management, CNBC (Mar. 21, 2018, 7:23 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/20/shareho 
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Zuckerberg and a few other insiders, while the Class A shares are held by the 
public.211  
The number of companies with dual-class voting structures has risen over the 
last decade. In 2005, only one percent of U.S. companies that went public had 
dual-class voting structures, but close to twenty percent of U.S. companies that 
went public had such structure in 2017.212 The number of companies with dual-
class voting structures increased by forty-four percent between 2005 and 
2015.213 By 2009, more than eight percent of public companies had dual-class 
shares; this rose to more than twelve percent in 2012.214 
On the one hand, if the number of companies with dual-class structures 
continues to grow, that growth will have a negative impact on shareholder 
activism. Companies may implement these structures for different reasons. For 
example, such structures ensure that certain individuals, such as the founder or 
a key executive, maintain control in order to implement a particular vision.215 
However, it is clear that the impact of such structures is to limit the influence of 
shareholders.216 Moreover, some companies have made clear that their purpose 
in implementing such structures was to limit the impact of shareholder 
activists.217  
On the other hand, it is possible that shareholder activism will impede the 
continued growth of companies with dual-class share structures. Indeed, dual-
class shares are not new. Many companies adopted dual-class stock structures in 




211 See id. 
212 See CFA INST., supra note 207, at 37. 
213 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RECOMMENDAITON OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE: DUAL CLASS AND OTHER ENTRENCHING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC 
COMPANIES 1 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/reco 
mmendation-on-dual-class-shares.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ98-GX3B]. 
214 See Stout, supra note 3, at 1182. 
215 See CFA INST., supra note 207, at 33. 
216 See Joann S. Lublin, Major Investors Push to End Dual-Class Shares, WALL STREET 
J., Jan. 31, 2017, at B3 (noting investors maintained that dual-class voting limits ability of 
shareholders to enact change). 
217 See Eve Tahmincioglu, The Pros & Cons of the Dual-Class Stock Structure: Two 
Corporate Governance Experts Battle It Out, DIRECTORS & BOARDS (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.directorsandboards.com/news/pros-cons-dual-class-stock-structure-two-
corporate-governance-experts-battle-it-out [https://perma.cc/DGE9-BM5H]; Dual Class 
Voting Share Structures, BLG BUS. VENTURE CLINIC (Apr. 4, 2018), http://www.business 
ventureclinic.ca/blog/dual-class-voting-share-structures [https://perma.cc/GN3B-DF8W] 
(noting that dual-class structures allows companies to execute their visions without “being at 
the mercy of investors”). 
218 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 4. 
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concerns about its rise and impact during that era.219 Ultimately, however, the 
number of companies embracing such structures did not rise significantly.220 
Hence, it is possible that concerns are unwarranted. 
Moreover, it is possible that the embrace of the shareholder activism norm, 
particularly by shareholders, will serve to counter any increase in dual-class 
shares. Indeed, in the 1980s, no one considered that shareholders would seek to 
play a significant role in curtailing the potential rise in such structures.221 Today, 
however, shareholders and their advocates have been vocal in their opposition 
to dual-class structures in the public markets.222 This includes efforts to 
encourage legislative prohibition of such structures.223 Notably, some 
shareholders have been successful in these efforts.224 This success underscores 
the fact that shareholder activism has taken root as well as the fact that such 
activism may be very difficult to uproot. 
B. Going Private 
Many new companies are avoiding IPOs.225 Some have suggested that this 
avoidance is linked to shareholder activism.226  
To be sure, the movement away from going public could decrease shareholder 
activism by shrinking the amount of activism in line with the overall public 
market shrinkage. It is also possible that some may seek to curtail shareholder 
activism based on a concern that such curtailment will make the public markets 
more attractive. 
It is not clear how this issue will play out. A host of federal laws and other 
market factors have made it easier to access capital outside of the public 
markets.227 Thus, irrespective of efforts to encourage public market 
participation, it is possible that the trend towards avoiding IPOs or going private 
may continue. However, as the next Section suggests, the normative embrace of 
 
219 See id. 
220 See CFA INST., supra 207, at 37 (detailing number of IPOs that were multi-class over 
previous decade). 
221 See Gordon, supra note 3, at 39-40. 
222 See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 19. 
223 See id. at 19 n.46. 
224 See id. at 19. 
225 See Stout, supra note 3, at 1179. 
226 See id. at 1179-80; Emily Thornton, Going Private, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 27, 2006, at 
53, 55. 
227 See EVA SU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45221, CAPITAL MARKETS, SECURITIES 
OFFERINGS AND RELATED POLICY ISSUES 2, 24-32 (2018); Elisabeth de Fontenay, The 
Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 
445, 460-70 (2017); Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, 
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shareholder activism makes it unclear whether and to what extent legislative or 
other efforts will be able to entirely derail the shift away from apathy.  
C. Federal Efforts 
There have been several efforts at the federal level to reduce the impact of 
shareholders. In June 2017, the House passed the Financial CHOICE Act (the 
“Choice Act”), which includes provisions aimed at amending the shareholder 
proposal rule.228 Those provisions include increases in eligibility rules for 
submitting a proposal and the resubmission thresholds.229 Similarly, the House 
Financial Services Committee passed a bill that focuses on altering the 
resubmission thresholds for submitted shareholder proposals.230 These efforts 
make clear that there is interest at the federal level to rollback shareholder 
activism. 
However, the embrace of the shareholder activism norm may render these 
efforts unworkable. The institutional investor opposition was so strong that 
when the Choice Act was finally passed, it did not include amendments related 
to the shareholder proposal rule.231 The fact that shareholders were able to 
jettison the efforts at curtailing shareholder engagement further emphasizes the 
activism and shareholders’ belief that their voice should not be curtailed. 
Moreover, many have predicted that even if federal legislation serves to 
eliminate some of the mandates that encouraged shareholder influence, there 
may be a private ordering response that mutes the effect of such elimination.  
Then too, because much of the shareholder influence emerged through private 
ordering, it is not clear if federal legislation can completely undercut that 
influence. Indeed, as Section II.C reveals, corporations have voluntarily altered 
their governance practices and procedures. Such corporations would have to 
affirmatively alter those procedures to rollback shareholder influence. It is not 
clear whether companies would be willing to engage in such an effort. This is 
especially true given companies’ growing belief that those procedures are in the 
corporation’s best interests. In other words, because companies not only have 
adapted to shareholder influence, but also have come to believe and accept the 
propriety of shareholder influence—at least in some respects—it seems unlikely 
that those companies will engage in efforts to completely dismantle that 
influence.  
 
228 See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 844 (2017). 
229 See id.; GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 21. 
230 See H.R. 5756, 115th Cong. § 1 (2018). 
231 See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 96, at 21; Press Release, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, 
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D. Short-Termism Concerns 
Some have argued that shareholder activism’s focus on the short term would 
trigger its eventual demise. In a 2013 article, Professor Lynn Stout predicted that 
shareholder primacy, and its related focus on increased shareholder power, seem 
“poised to fall, perhaps even more quickly than it ascended.”232 Professor Stout 
insisted that shareholder activists’ focus on short-term stock prices, ignoring the 
interests of other constituents and selling vital assets, not only made shareholder 
power undesirable, but also increased the likelihood that it would quickly come 
to an end.233 In support of this prediction, Professor Stout pointed out that many 
influential members of the corporate community who initially embraced 
shareholder power had come to view it with disfavor.234 Importantly, corporate 
officers and directors have been able to stem the tide of shareholder power by 
strenuously insisting that such power was antithetical and dangerous to the 
interests of other constituents.235 Hence, it is possible that such a narrative could 
undermine the current effort to enhance shareholder power, while encouraging 
a return to shareholder apathy. 
However, Professor Stout admitted that her prediction about the demise of 
shareholder power was made with caution.236 In light of the continued growth of 
shareholder power, coupled with its embrace by shareholders and directors alike, 
her prediction has not yet come to pass. Importantly, Professor Stout and others 
have taken aim at shareholder power particularly when it is used to promote a 
concept of shareholder wealth maximization that focuses on short-term financial 
gains at the expense of focusing on long-term interests, including those of 
customers, employees, and society.237 One reason why shareholder influence 
may weather the storm is that shareholders have played a role in altering the 
narrative related to corporate purpose. Rather than coinciding with a crowding 
out of other constituent interests, the rise in shareholder activism may have 
ushered in a different understanding of corporate purpose, at least for some 
shareholders. In fact, in a 2005 article, I suggested that shareholder power could 
be used to advance the interests of other constituents.238 Professor David Webber 
has made a similar suggestion.239 Consistent with this prediction, some 
shareholders and their advocates have played a role in ensuring a corporate focus 
 
232 See Stout, supra note 3, at 1180. 
233 See id. 
234 See id. 
235 See Fairfax, supra note 46, at 78. 
236 See Stout, supra note 3, at 1181. 
237 See id. at 1182. 
238 See Fairfax, supra note note 46, at 82. 
239 See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST 
BEST WEAPON 1-44 (2018). 
 
  
2019] FROM APATHY TO ACTIVISM 1343 
 
beyond short-term profits.240 This includes not only public pension funds, but 
also influential asset managers and mutual funds such as BlackRock, State 
Street, and Vanguard.241 The fact that shareholders have used their increased 
power to augment the interests of other constituents not only may make such 
power more appropriate in the eyes of some, but also may mute the concerns 
that such power may prove detrimental to other corporate stakeholders. 
E. Retail Investors 
As indicated in Part II, most retail investors have not been a part of the 
increase in shareholder activism.242 This is concerning for a number of reasons, 
including that retail investors may have interests that diverge from those of 
institutional investors. Thus, future shareholder activism that continues to 
exclude retail investors is problematic. This Article therefore supports efforts 
aimed at enhancing activism and participation among retail investors. 
F. A Note for Regulators  
On the one hand, this Article primarily focuses on the impact of recent 
developments on the shareholder activism norm and thus grapples with the 
extent to which those developments may impact the future of shareholder 
activism. On the other hand, this Article maintains not only that there has been 
a descriptive and normative shift from apathy to activism, but also that recent 
developments are not likely to completely undermine that shift. As a result, this 
Article also maintains that regulators must better account for the shift. To be 
sure, the SEC appears to be mindful of the shift and hence may be better prepared 
to take steps that appropriately account for it. However, the SEC is not the only 
agency that regulates the conduct of corporations and their investors. Moreover, 
there are some trends suggesting that other agencies are not appropriately 
accounting for the shift from apathy to activism. For example, prompted by 
research and scholarly attention from others, a recent article by Professors 
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241 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 85, at 23; see also id. at 9 (noting 
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9c0ad2d7c5b5. 
242 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
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Edward Rock and Daniel Rubinfeld illuminates some ways in which 
institutional shareholders’ increased activism may create antitrust concerns.243 
Rock and Rubinfeld also suggest that the current regulatory environment may 
be ill-equipped to sufficiently respond to these concerns.244 The authors point 
out that the current regulatory framework, coupled with regulators’ outdated 
presumptions of shareholder apathy, not only may lead to inappropriate 
applications of the law, but also may undermine shareholder activism or 
otherwise lead to suboptimal behavior on the part of investors seeking to reduce 
their liability risks.245 While a more systematic analysis of the manner in which 
regulators must account for the shift towards the shareholder activism norm is 
certainly warranted, it is beyond the scope of this Article.246 However, any such 
analysis likely should focus on at least four considerations. First, regulators 
should consider the manner in which increased shareholder activism may raise 
concerns that are not captured by the current regulatory framework. In other 
words, do shareholders’ increased activism and engagement trigger violations 
of the law in ways previously unanticipated?247 Second, regulators should 
consider the extent to which the current regulatory framework or current 
intepretations of that framework, including intepretations of safe-harbor 
provisions, are consistent with the new shareholder activism norm.248 Third, 
regulators should consider the extent to which the regulatory framework 
undermines shareholder activism or otherwise may constrain activism in an 
inappropriate manner.249 Fourth, and consistent with these prior 
recommendations, regulators must plan for the future of activism. Indeed, as 
Rock and Rubinfeld note, scholars already are suggesting changes to federal 
laws that may be driven by an understanding of shareholder behavior that is 
incompatable with the existing shareholder activism norm.250  
 
243 See Edward Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82 
ANTITRUST L.J. 221, 222, 229-30 (2018). 
244 See id. at 223-24, 227-29. 
245 See id. 
246 Special thanks to Edward Rock for pointing out the need to consider the relationship 
between the shift towards apathy and the broader regulatory framework. 
247 See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 243, at 258-63 (discussing Professor Einer Elhauge’s 
antitrust analysis). 
248 See id. at 265-67. The antitrust laws provide a limited safe harbor, only when activities 
are deemed to be “solely for investment” purposes. Id. at 251-52. As Rock and Rubinfeld 
suggest, to the extent the “solely for investment” safe harbor embedded in the antitrust laws 
is one that protects only those investors who remain passive, the current antitrust safe harbor 
rule appears to presume a general passivity among all investors that is not consistent with the 
reality of activism in which many institutional investors participate and thus may not provide 
a meaningful distinction for purposes of the antitrust laws. See id. at 265-67. 
249 See id. at 266-67 (discussing impact of alterations to the safe harbor rules on corporate 
governance and activism). 
250 See id. at 263 (discussing Posner’s solution). 
  
2019] FROM APATHY TO ACTIVISM 1345 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article highlights a new reality for public company shareholders. Public 
company shareholders have been active. Indeed, few would dispute the notion 
that public company shareholders have become increasingly more active around 
a range of governance issues and that such activism runs counter to the traditonal 
manner in which shareholders engaged with the corporation. 
This Article also highlights a lesser acknowledged normative reality. 
Shareholders and directors have come to accept the propriety of shareholder 
voice and influence. They have come to believe that shareholders can and should 
play a role in holding directors accountable and shaping corporate practices. Of 
course, there continues to be significant debate regarding the contours and extent 
of that role. There also continues to be significant debate about which 
shareholders should play such a role. However, there is no longer a debate about 
the appropriateness of the role itself. Shareholders have become active and 
directors have accepted that such activism can be beneficial to the corporation—
at least when wielded in an appropriate fashion and when wielded by 
shareholders deemed to have appropriate goals. 
Of course making future predictions is always difficult. It is entirely possible 
that the shareholder activism norm will decline as quickly as it emerged. 
However, even if this possibility exists, it is clear that, at least at present, 
shareholder activism has toppled the shareholder apathy norm. It is therefore 
important to at least acknowledge this present norm. Perhaps more importantly, 
in light of the fact that shareholder activism has been embraced by so many 
shareholders and by so many of the key stakeholders within the investment 
community, it is more probable that the activism norm will remain a fixture of 
the future corporate governance landscape at least to some extent and with 
respect to some shareholders. Hence, it is also important to more carefully 
consider the future implications of a corporate governance norm that favors an 
active shareholder. 
